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INTRODUCTION

Section 402A is dead; long live the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
ProductsLiability. In approving the substantive provisions of Tentative
Draft No. 2 of the new products liability Restatement in 1995,1 the
American Law Institute (A.L.I.) effectively repealed the most frequently cited, and arguably the most influential, section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 Although it will be several years before the
entire new Restatement is released, Tentative Draft No. 2, which defines
" [I]iability for the sale or distribution of defective products," represents the first and most important chapter.3 For the time being, section 402A remains the law in jurisdictions that have adopted it either
judicially, 4 or through legislative enactment. 5 But by endorsing the
first portion of the new Restatement, the A.L.I. has acknowledged that
1 In May 1995, the American Law Institute approved, subject to editorial revision and
an opportunity for additional discussion, sections 1 through 8 and section 11 of Tentative
Draft No. 2 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS]. See, e.g., AL Approves Products
Liability Restatement, 63 U.S.L.W. 2734 (May 30, 1995).
2 HenryJ. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, A.B-A.J., Aug. 1992, at 18. The text
of § 402A reads:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supranote 1, at ch. 1.
4 See State Chart-Acceptance of Strict Liability, 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
4016
(Nov. 1988 & Apr. 1989). Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia adopted the
Restatement's version of strict products liability. Id. Seven states and Puerto Rico adopted
other variations. Id. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia
have not yet recognized strict products liability. Id. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROD-

ucTs Ltiant-n § 16:9 (3d ed. 1987) (listing states that have adopted RESTATEMENT (SEc.
ON) OF TORTS § 402A), §§ 16:13-17 (listing states that have adopted alternative strict
liability approaches), § 16:18 (listing states that have rejected strict products liability).
5 See AR. CODE ANN. § 4-86-102 (Michie 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-3 (Burns
1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (West 1964); OF- REv. STAT. § 30.920 (1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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after three decades ofjudicial application and interpretation, section
402A has become a legal anachronism.
The last thirty years have witnessed an explosion in products liability litigation. Pressed by social policy considerations, judges have
had to strain the language of section 402A in order to accommodate
lawsuits brought by litigants who claimed they were injured through

the use of defective products. As a result, although section 402A has
remained the root of contemporary products liability doctrine, its rel-

evance to modem situations has steadily declined.6 Consequently, the
A.L.I. chose to open its new Restatement of Torts with a restatement of
American products liability law. 7 In May 1992, the Institute officially

commenced the project by appointing Professors Henderson and
Twerski co-reporters of the products liability chapters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.8 Since then, the co-reporters have released two
tentative drafts and a series of intermediate drafts of the first chapter,
covering the basis of manufacturer liability and affirmative defenses
based on user misconduct. 9
As is the case with any revision of the law, the new Restatement has

faced substantial criticism from its inception. The plaintiffs' bar objected to the selection of co-reporters Henderson and Twerski, whose

previous work, including a co-authored proposal for revising section
402A, exhibited a strong pro-business bent. 10 In addition, critics have

repeatedly argued that the co-reporters' position runs against the current of existing law on liability for defective design. Specifically, these
6 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELu L. REv. 1512, 1513 (1992) [hereinafter A
ProposedRevision] ("[Dioctrinal developments in products liability have placed such a heavy
gloss on the original text of and comments to section 402A as to render them anachronistic and at odds with their currently discerned objectives.")
7 The decision to revise the Restatement (Second) of Torts was announced on March 18,
1992. The decision was reached "because § 402A 'has proven so influential in the development' of modern product liability law" and the existing version is "becoming 'increasingly
irrelevant and unresponsive to contemporary needs'." AL to Begin Work on Restatement
(Third); Professors Propose Revisions to Section 402A, BNA PROD. LAB. DAILY, Mar. 18, 1992;
Law Institute Attendees Plan 5-Year Project; Members Agree on Core of Proposed Treatise, BNA
PROD. LiAB. DALY, May 12, 1992.
8 The A.L. announced the names of the reporters and their advisors on June 11,
1992. See InstituteAnnounces Advisory CommitteeforRestatementProductsLiability Pevision, BNA
PROD. LLAB. DAiLY, June 11, 1992; ProminentLaw Professors Offered Positions as Co-Reporters on
Product Liability Study, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 547 (May 22, 1992).
9 See RESrATEMENT (THiRD) OF ToRTs, supranote 1, at xxvii-xxix (Introductory Note).
The topics covered by the first chapter are "Product Defectiveness," "Rules of Liability
Governing Special Product Markets," "Causation," and "Defenses." Id. at xix-xxiv.
10 See, e.g., Already on the Record, LEGAL TIMES, June 8, 1992, at 3 (reporting allegations
that Professors Henderson and Twerski are pro-business in philosophy and are financially
backed by business concerns). See also A ProposedRevision, supra note 6; James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TouRo L R~a. 107,
111-12 (1993) [hereinafter Revising Section 402A] ("For years I had written what was widely
viewed, and I think fairly viewed, as pro-defendant material.").
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critics contend that adopting a risk-utility balancing test and making
proof of a reasonable alternative design an obligatory element of
plaintiff's prima facie case amounts to academic tort reform." Consequently, when the co-reporters released Tentative Draft No. 1 for consideration in 1994, intense criticism and opposition in response
thereto convinced A.L.I. officials to postpone voting on the draft
12
pending further consideration.
On March 13, 1995, the co-reporters released Tentative Draft No.
2. The second draft's treatment of design defects differed from its
predecessor in two respects. First, the co-reporters included a lengthy
discussion of case law in support of their approach to design defects.' 3
Second, the co-reporters added comment d, which provides a possible
exemption from the reasonable alternative design requirement for
products with a "manifestly unreasonable design."' 4 Comment d incorporates an amendment originally proposed by a member of the
plaintiffs' bar and adopted by the A.L.I. at its 1994 meeting. 15 The
members of the A.L.I. overwhelmingly approved Tentative Draft No. 2
as modified. This Note addresses the fidelity of comment d to current
products liability law and the wisdom of endorsing categorical product
liability by exempting selected categories of products from the reasonable alternative design requirement.
This Note argues that the A.L.I. should remove comment d from
the new Restatement. Unchanged, this comment invites plaintiffs' lawyers to challenge a variety of necessarily dangerous products, including such common and popular products as cigarettes, alcohol,
handguns, three-wheel all-terrain vehicles, trampolines, and aboveground pools. Determining whether such products are defective in
design would enmesh courts in a web of conflicting social policies and
interests that they are not designed to handle. 16 The courts' steadfast
rejection of categorical liability indicates their recognition that to embark on such ventures would exceed their institutional limits. 17 More-

over, the co-reporters' inability to satisfactorily confine the breadth of
11 See, e.g., Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second),
Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L Rv. 411 (1993) (arguing that the Restatement's proposed rule "reflects neither the evolution nor the true state of existing products liability
law"); Larry S. Stewart, The ALT and Products Liability: 'Restatement' or 'Reform, TRAL, Sept.
1994, at 29 ("It appears that the reporters may be feeling too much the gravitational pull of
tort 'reform.'").
12 See ALT Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Products Liability RestatementEfforts, 62 U.S.L.W.
2734, 2735 (May 31, 1994) [hereinafter ALtHesitates]; HenryJ. Reske, New Torts Restatement
Debated; A.BA J., Aug. 1994, at 24.
13 RESTATEmENT (THIRD) TORTS, supranote 1, § 2 cmt. c.
14 Id. cmt. d.
15
See ALT Hesitates, supra note 12, at 2735.
16 See infra part IVA

17

See infra part IV.B.1.

19961

NOTE-CATEGORICAL LIABILITY

1185

comment d's exception compromises the effectiveness of the reasonable alternative design requirement and may, in the long-run, eviscerate it completely.' 8
This Note is divided into four Parts. Part I offers a brief introduction to the concept of categorical product liability. Part II first outlines the Restatement process and its objectives, and then discusses the
predicament that convinced the A.L.I. to draft a new Restatement of
American products liability law. Part III discusses design defectiveness
under the new Restatement and explains the comment d caveat to the
general rule rejecting the notion of categorical liability. Finally, Part
IV presents the following three-fold argument for removing comment
d: (i) categorical liability, even if limited to products with a "manifestly unreasonable design," goes beyond the institutional limitations
of the adjudicative process; (ii) courts and legislatures have consistently rejected challenges to entire product categories; and (iii) retaining comment d would create a substantial likelihood that the
exception would eventually swallow the rule.
I
PRODUCT CATEGORY LIABILITY

In recent years, a number of plaintiffs and commentators have
urged the courts to adopt a theory of products. liability that would
hold manufacturers and suppliers accountable for product-related injuries even though their products contained no traditional manufacturing, design or warning defects.' 9 This proposed theory, often
referred to as "product category liability," is based on the idea that
certain types of products-perhaps "Saturday Night Special" handguns, cigarettes or above-ground pools-may pose such extreme risks
of injury to the consumer that they should be regarded as inherently
defective. Cigarettes, for example, may kill or severely impair the
health of too many people to justify the benefit and pleasure they provide to smokers. Likewise, above-ground swimming pools may cause
more injuries than they are worth to society. The claim of defectiveness in each of these cases is not based on the manufacturer's failure
to make the product safer, but rather on the inherently dangerous
nature of the product itself. In other words, the products are allegedly defective because they fail a gross risk-utility analysis: the overall
benefit they provide is outweighed by the accident costs they generate.
Proponents of categorical liability argue that if the cumulative risk of
18
19

See infra part IV.C.

See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. &Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier The Rejection of Liaility Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L REv. 1263, 1297-1328
(1991) [hereinafter Closing the Frontier] (discussing proposals for product category
liability).
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loss associated with a product significantly surpasses its potential social
worth, then the product's manufacturer should be absolutely liable
20
for any harm its product creates.
This concept of categorical liability is a significant departure from
established products liability doctrine. Under the traditional approach, a design defect inheres in a manufacturer's failure to adopt
an alternative design which would have significantly reduced the risks
of injury associated with the product at an acceptable cost and without
unduly sacrificing the product's utility.2 ' In contrast, categorical liability would hold a manufacturer or seller accountable for any injuries
resulting from the use of its products, even in the absence of a safer
and feasible alternative design. This observation has led some commentators to view this theory as "liability without defect."2 2 Professors
Henderson and Twerski point out that under this theory, "[c]ausation
alone, rather than the traditional combination of causation and defectiveness, would constitute the plaintiff's prima facie case."2 3 If courts
were to accept categorical liability, they would, for the first time, impose true nonfault liability for all product-related injuries and, more
significantly, for injuries caused by generic characteristics of products. 2 4 Such an approach cuts against the courts' long-standing and
emphatic refusal to convert manufacturers into insurers of their prod25
ucts' safety.
Proponents of categorical liability claim that the categorical liability approach does not dramatically depart from traditional doctrine,
and that it merely extends the defect-based standard to entire product
categories.2 6 They offer several arguments in support of their claim.
First, they assert that courts should retain the ability to assess entire
categories of products, because some consumers cannot fully and effectively appreciate the excessive risks of harm posed by certain products, and thus cannot approach such risks rationally.2 7 Second,
20
See e.g., Andrew 0. Smith, The Manufacture and Distributionof Handguns as an Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 375-79 (1987).

21

SeeJames A. Henderson,Jr.,Judicial

view of Manufacturers'ConsciousDesignChoices:

The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1543 n.41 (1973).

22 Closingthe Frontier,supranote 19, at 1276-77.
23 Id. at 1277; see Windle Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Vwtims, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 41, 46 (1982).
24
Closing the Frontier,supra note 19, at 1277.
25 See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
("[U]nder Texas law, the manufacturer is not required to insure that its products are completely safe or that they will not cause injury to anyone."); Closingthe Frontier,supranote 19,
at 1271-73 (discussing courts' distaste for the concept of absolute liability).
26
See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in TheirEyes:Product CategoryLiability and Alternative FeasibleDesigns in the Third Restatement 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429 (1994); see also Turley,
supranote 28, at 54.
27
See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in The New Restatement 61 TENN. L. REv. 1241, 1254-57 (1994).
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proponents of categorical liability maintain that shifting accident costs
to manufacturers and suppliers of high-risk products will restrict, if
not eliminate, the availability of such products, thus decreasing the
level of overall product risk in the marketplace.2 8 Finally, proponents
argue that imposing categorical liability on manufacturers does not
necessarily burden manufacturers in that they can spread the costs of
29
injuries among all product users through increased prices.
In the history of American products liability law, courts have accepted the notion of categorical liability on only three occasions.3 0 In
each instance, the courts' decisions were subsequently overridden by
legislative acts.3 1 The A.L.I. and the reporters for the new Restatement
should follow suit. Strong institutional and policy considerations support the rejection of categorical liability and the removal of Comment
d from the new Restatement. Proof of a reasonable alternative design
should remain an integral part of the plaintiff s prima facie case of
design defectiveness.
II
THE RESTATEMENT PROCESS, SECTION

402A, AND BEYOND

The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability represents the
A.L.I.'s latest attempt to clarify the rules of the common law and to
respond to thirty years of confusion in products liability law under
section 402A of the Restatement (Second). The success of the new Restatement depends largely on its acceptance by the legal community "as
prima facie a correct statement" of the law of products liability opera32
tive in the great majority of American jurisdictions.
A.

The Restatement Process and Its Objectives

The A.L.I.3 3 first undertook the process of restating the law in
34
Com1923 with the subjects of contracts, torts, and conflict of laws.
posed primarily ofjudges, academics, and practitioners, the Institute
sought to bring clarity and order to an ever-growing and diverse com28
See, e.g., HaIphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 118 (La. 1986);
Smith, supra note 20, at 376; Turley, supra note 23, at 46.
29
See, e.g., Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 116-18; Smith, supra note 20, at 379; Turley, supra
note 23, at 46. But cf Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1213 (rejecting this argument).
30 See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
31 See infra part IV.B.2.
32 See William Draper Lewis, Introductionto 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY viii-ix (1936).
33 The A.L.I. consists of "legal scholars who are responsible for the Restatements in
the various disciplines of the law...." BLAcK's LAw DIaIoNARY 75 (5th ed. 1979). See
generaly Herbert F. Goodrich, The Story of theAmerican Law Institute, 1951 WASH. L. REv. 283
(discussing the composition and objectives of the Institute).
34 SeeWilliam Draper Lewis, "How We Did It" History ofthe American Law lnstituteand the
First Restatement of the Law, in ALI, RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 1-9 (perm. ed. 1945).
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mon law in an effort to promote a "better administration ofjustice. '3 5
To this end, the Restatements combined sections of black-letter text
with explanatory comments, illustrations, and reporters' notes. In selecting this format, the Institute hoped courts would treat the blackletter sections as highly persuasive, if not mandatory, authority.3 6 In
addition to its first round of Restatements, the A.L.I. has over the
years addressed other subjects, including property, professional responsibility, and judgments. Moreover, the Institute has also developed a number of model codes designed specifically as a guide for
37
statutory enactment.
Despite the prominence and influence of its Restatements, the
A.L.I. never intended to act as a legislative body. Early in the Institute's existence, however, some of its members believed that a project
which aimed to clarify and order the common law also presented a
perfect opportunity to make the law more progressive.3 8 For instance,
as Dean (later Judge) Herbert F. Goodrich remarked, some legal
scholars at the time believed that the Restatements should play a more
active role in the social reform of tort law.3 9 Although giving the Restatements a more normative outlook attracted significant support,
the majority of the Institute's members believed in limiting the process to clarifying perceived confusion within existing law.40 Accord-

ingly, after a floor debate, the A.L.I. resolved the issue by deciding
that its Restatements of the Law should be, "and [are] substantially
limited to a statement of the law as it is."41 This has not, however,
prevented the A.L.I. from drawing criticism for asserting rules and
policies not attributable to courts or legislatures. In a recent article
responding to an A.L.I. study on personal injury and enterprise liability, a retired federal judge attacked the "elitist, privately controlled"
Institute and its "tremendous, unfettered, [and] unaccountable
power," that allows it, in effect, to legislate and change the common
law without trusting "the collective wisdom of the 'common' people"
35 "The particular business and objects of the society are educational, and are to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social
needs, to secure the better administration ofjustice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work." The American Law Institute Certificate of Incorporation,68 A.L.I.
PROC. 888 (1991).
36 See generally N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the

American Law Institute, 8 L & HisT. REv. 55 (1990).
37 The A.L.I. developed the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, the MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, and the MODEL PENAL CODE. It also collaborated with the Uniform Law Commissioner on the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
38 See Hull, supranote 86, at 81-85. See also Herbert Wechsler, Speech at 61st Annual

A.L.I. Meeting (May 15-18, 1984), in 1984 A.L.I. PROC. 42, 50-51.
89
See Herbert F. Goodrich, What Would Law Teachers Like to See the InstituteDoP, 8 AM.
L. SCH. REv. 494, 494-95 (1936).
40 See Hull, supra note 36, at 81-85.
41 Goodrich, supra note 39, at 505.
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as reflected in legislation enacted by their "duly elected federal and
state representatives." 42
The format of the Restatements makes them uniquely unsuited to
reforming the law through rules which reflect minority law or entirely
novel ideas. Commentators may often elevate Restatement provisions
to the level of law, but their effect on courts remains limited to persuasive authority.43 Thus, even though the black-letter sections aim to be
decisive, their acceptance depends on the courts' general "agreement
with [the] factual and normative assertions" underlying the legal standards proposed therein and explained in the accompanying comments. 44 If a judge disagrees with the policies underlying the
proposed rule, or considers it contrary to the majority view, he will
simply ignore it. Thus, although situations may arise in which two
equally cogent lines of authority are available, where there is a clear
consensus about a point of law, the Restatement should reflect that
45
consensus.
The judiciary's historical respect for the Restatement process further underscores the importance of a consensus approach in drafting
Restatement provisions. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) is an
unparalleled example of a black-letter provision that attracted a wide
judicial consensus and thus provided a standard followed in countless
decisions. 46 The courts' continued deference to the Restatements depends in part on the Institute's fidelity to the actual state of the law.
Thus, if the A.L.I. is to accomplish its goal of clarifying and unifying
the common law, the rules contained in its Restatements must reflect
majority positions, or at a minimum must not unduly conflict with
established doctrines. Judges who disagree with the Institute's legislative aspirations are likely to stifle any attempts by the Institute to reform an area of the law through illegitimate means.

42 Paul A. Simmons, Government by an UnaccountablePrivateNon Profit Corporation, 10
N.Y. L. SCH.J. Hum. Rrs. 67, 67 (1992) (responding to American Law Institute, Reporters'
Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991)).
43
See, e.g., Revising Section 402A, supra note 10, at 107-08. But see Oscar S. Gray, Reflections on the Historical Context of Section 402A, 10 ToURo L. REv. 75, 75-76 (1993) (arguing
that the Restatement is not law).
44 Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: "PublicPolicy" Without Public Politics7, 28 VAL. U. L.
REv. 821, 841 (1994); see generally Hull, supranote 36.
45
See Covey T. Oliver, The American Law Institute's Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 428, 434 (1961).
46 By March 1, 1991, appellate courts cited to various Restatements a total of 114,145
times. Of that total, about 40% (45,954) were to the Restatements of Torts. 14 A.L.I. REP. 1
(Oct. 1991). See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts: A Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONz. L. REv. 205, 205-07 (1989/1990).
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The Aftermath of Section 402A

Perhaps the A.L.I.'s crowning achievement during its first seventy
years in existence has indeed been section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Adopted in 1964, section 402A has since become the
nearly universal rule in cases involving product-related injuries. Its accomplishment is amplified by the fact that when it was adopted, the
section was supported by a single case 47and was intended to apply only
to latent manufacturing defects. 48 Instead, courts concerned with af-

fording injured consumers easier legal recourse against manufacturers and suppliers took advantage of its broad language and relied
upon its underlying policies to significantly restate the duties and responsibilities of product sellers to consumers. In the years following
its adoption, courts used section 402A to abolish such deeply entrenched "no duty" rules as the patent danger doctrine, 49 the shifting
duty rule,50 the intended purpose doctrine, 51 and the bystander
rule.52 As a result, plaintiffs could proceed against the manufacturers
on theories of generic product defects, defects which inhered in the
47

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).

48

See George L. Priest, Strict ProductsLiability: The OriginalInten 10 CARnozo L. REv.

2301, 2311 (1989) (concluding that design defects were not intended to be subject to strict
liability).
49
The leading case denying liability where the danger was obvious was Campo v.
Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950). The court held that a manufacturer was "under no
duty to render a machine or other article 'more' safe-as long as the danger to be avoided
is obvious and patent to all." Id. at 804. Campo was reversed in Micallefv. Miehle Co., 348
N.E.2d 571 (N.Y 1976); accord Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1970);
Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 476 P.2d 713 (Wash. 1970). See generally FowLER V.
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF ToRTs § 28.5 (1956) (discussing opposition to
the idea that the obviousness of the danger should preclude liability); Stanton F. Darling
II, The PatentDangerRule: An Analysis and A Survey of its Vitality, 29 MERCER L. REv. 583, 60409 (1978) (arguing that the patent danger rule serves no purpose significant enough to
offset the injustices it produces); Patricia Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a
Right: Manufacturers'Liabilityfor Patently DangerousProducts, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065 (1973)
(asserting that the law surrounding the patent danger rule is confused and in need of
reform).
50 For cases denying liability under the shifting duty doctrine, see Stultz v. Benson
Lumber Co., 59 P.2d 100 (Cal. 1936); McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 181
N.E.2d 430 (N.Y. 1962). The foreseeability issue is now treated as a question for the jury.
See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Cal. App. 1973); Comstock v.
General Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290
A.2d 286 (N.J. 1972).
51 See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 836 (1966), overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109-10 (7th Cir.
1977). Liability for foreseeable misuse is now widely accepted. See, e.g., Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28 (Or. 1973); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255
(RI. 1971); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). See generaly
Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Facesof Misuse: An Inquiry Into the EmergingDoctrine of Comparative Causation,29 MERCER L REv. 403 (1978) (discussing trends in tort law including "foreseeable misuse").
52
See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969); Haumersen v.
Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1977); Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
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design and marketing of the product rather than in its production. 53
By 1980, American courts drew upon section 402A to put in place a
liability regime with a remarkably expansive vision of consumers'
54
rights.
Concerned primarily with protecting the rights of consumers,
courts readily overlooked the linguistic limitations of section 402A.
Eager to respond to what they perceived to be a social injustice, they
embellished the section with newly created doctrines that were only
loosely connected to the language contained therein. 55 Accordingly,
courts began categorizing product defects as manufacturing, design,
and warning defects. 5 6 No longer guided by the language of section
402A, courts devised various approaches for determining what constituted each type of defect. More recently, numerous courts and commentators began to question the conceptual appropriateness of strict
liability outside of the context of manufacturing defects. 5 7 As a result,
although widespread acceptance of the principles behind section
402A remains, some regard its formulation as "anachronistic and at
odds with [its] currently discerned objectives." 5 8
The confusion generated by section 402A is especially manifest in
the courts' varied treatments of design defects. Section 402A states
that one who sells any product in a defective condition, which makes
the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, or to
his property, is subject to liability for the harm caused by the prodSee also Note, Strict ProductsLiability to the Bystander. A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38
U. CM. L. Rayv. 625, 626 n.12 (1971).
53 See Henderson, supra note 21, at 154244.
54 See generallyJamesA. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. R-v. 773 (1979)
(arguing that challenges to the developing consensus on defective products are
misguided).
55

See, e.g., MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIAIumT

AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE

(1993). Shapo writes:
[I]n products liability, a central component ofjustice is the vulnerable position of consumers. A related element ofjustice lies in the moral innocence
of the claimant.... [T]he moral innocence of the plaintiff takes on special
significance because of itsjoinder with his or her vulnerability and with the
very fact of injury itself.
Id. at 137.
56 See A ProposedRevision, supranote 6, at 1515. See also Uniform Product Liability Act,
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979) (section 104 specifically categorizes the types of product defects for which the manufacturer can be held liable); W. PAGE KEETON El AL., ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984). Section 99 states that
a product is defective as marketed... for any of the following reasons: (1) a
flaw in the product that was present in the product at the time the defendant sold it; (2) a failure by the producer or assembler of a product adequately to warn of a risk or hazard related to the way the product was
designed; or (3) a defective design.
Id.
57 See A Proposed Revision, supranote 6, at 1517.
58 Id. at 1513.
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uct.5 9 A "defective condition" is defined as one "not contemplated by
the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him."60 Comment i similarly defines "unreasonably dangerous" to
mean that the product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer... with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community concerning the product's characteristics." 6 1 Although the circularity of these definitions
did not affect cases involving manufacturing flaws, it significantly con62
fused judicial analysis in design cases.
1.

Risk-Utility v. Consumer Expectations et al.

In responding to section 402A's definitional inadequacy in the
context of design defects, courts have developed a variety of standards
to determine when a product is defectively designed. 65 Today, most
would agree that the term "defectively designed" refers either to a design that is unreasonably dangerous, 64 or to one that creates an unreasonable risk of harm.6 5 However, some would dispute the meaning of
the term "unreasonable."6 6 A significant majority of American jurisdictions measure the unreasonableness of a product design by some
form of risk-utility67 or risk-benefit 68 analysis. This approach generally
requires the courts to compare the risks and benefits of two alternative versions of the product. If the overall risk of loss or injury could
have been significantly reduced by adoption of the proposed alternative at a reasonable cost or a reasonable loss of utility, the product
design is deemed defective. 69 In applying this test, courts often rely
70
on a series of risk-utility factors developed by Professor Wade.
59
60
61
62
REv.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).

Id. cmt. g.
Id. cmt. i.
See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Searchfor the Middle Ground,56 N.C. L.
643, 648-50 (1978) (discussing the confusion generated by § 402A). See also 5 FOWLER

V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.32A, at 584-88 (2d ed. 1986);John W. Wade, On

the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825, 830-32 (1973).
68
See I M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILry §§ 6.5-6.10 (2d ed. 1988).
64 See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
65 Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980).
66 See Sheila Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test forDesignDefect: From Negligence [to Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 598-600 (1980).

67
68

See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984).
See, e.g., West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods. Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Cal. App.

1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986).

69 See Wade, supranote 62, at 837-38. For a case using the Wade factors, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alaska 1979). For a critique of the Wade factors, see W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REv.
573 (1990).
70 See, e.g., CatepillarTractor,593 P.2d at 883 (citing Wade, supra note 62, at 839-40).
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Other courts define a defectively designed product as one which,
at the time of sale or distribution, is in a condition not reasonably
contemplated or expected by the ultimate user or consumer. 71 Moreover, some courts have adopted the approach developed by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,7 2 which
provides for both of the above tests. Thus, in these jurisdictions, a
product is defective in design either when its utility is outweighed by
its inherent danger, or when the product fails to perform as safely as a
reasonable consumer would expect. 73 Still other courts determine if a
product design is unreasonably dangerous based on whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer, aware of the product's propensity to
cause harm, would nevertheless decide to place it in the stream of
commerce.7 4 Regardless of the formulation they adopt, all courts require, either explicitly or in practice, proof that the manufacturer
failed to adopt a safer and more cost-effective alternative design
before they will impose liability for defective design. 75 In noting the
confusion that surrounds the definition of design defect, one commentator remarked, "It may now be true that [design] defect, like obscenity in Justice Stewart's definition, will be discovered by sense
impression. Unfortunately 'I know it when I see it' will not suffice as a
76
judicial standard for products liability."
2.

Strict Liability v. Negligence

Widespread disagreement among judges and commentators regarding the proper role of negligence principles in design defect law
further obscures the meaning of the term "defect" in the context of
product design. As one court observed, "[T] here is a split of opinion
as to whether a distinction exists between negligence and strict liability theories of recovery when applied to cases based upon design de71 See generally Marshall S. Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of Consumer Protection:Doctrine,Function and Legal LiabilityforProduct.Disappointment,60 VA. L. Ruv. 1109, 1370 (1974)
("Judgments of liability for consumer product disappointment should center initially and
principally on the portrayal of the product which is made, caused to be made or permitted
by the seller."). For a critique of this approach, see generally Wade, supranote 62, at 83233.
72 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978).
73
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Ontai v. Straub Clinic
& Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983).
74 See, e.g., Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980); Church
v. Wesson, 385 S.E.2d 393 (W. Va. 1989).
75 SeeMichaelJ. T~ke, Note, Restatement (Third) of Torts andDesign Defectiveness in American ProductsLiability Law, 5 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 239 (1996).
76 Aaron D. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to ComparativeFault-RethinkingSome Product
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 304-05 (1977) (referring to Justice Stewart's concurrence regarding the definition of "obscenity" in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964)).
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fects."77 The problem is partly rooted in the language of section
402A. The California Supreme Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,78
was the first to note that the "unreasonably dangerous" standard contained in section 402A sounds like negligence, and would thus require
the plaintiff to prove the absence of reasonable care on the part of the
manufacturer. 79 The court went on to reject the standard and
stressed that strict liability is not negligence.8 0 Likewise, Professor
Wade observed that "the test for imposing strict liability is whether the
product was unreasonably dangerous, to use the words of the Restatement ....It may be argued that this is simply a test of negligence.
Exactly."8 1 Moreover, although an overwhelming majority of states
have been persuaded by various policy reasons to adopt some form of
strict products liability in tort,8 2 numerous courts and commentators
77
78

79
80

Stanley v. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Me. 1983).
501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
Id. at 1162.
Id.

81 John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5, 15 (1965). See
Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 610 ("When ajury decides that the risk of harm outweighs the
utility of a particular design... it is saying that in choosing the particular design and cost
trade-offs, the manufacturer exposed the consumer to greater risk of danger than he
should have. Conceptually and analytically, this approach bespeaks negligence.").
82
See, e.g., Richard W. Bieman, Strict Products Liability: An Overview of State Law, 10J.
PROD. Ltau. 111 (1987). One of the best statements of the policyjustifications for imposing
strict products liability is found injustice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. CocaCola Bottling Co.:
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest
to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace
to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it
is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they
may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly
they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general
one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection
and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.
150 P.2d 436, 44041 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). For a discussion of efficiency
goals of tort law, see GuIDo A. CALABREsi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 17-21 (1970); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-24 (4th ed.

1992). For a discussion of fairness goals, see ThomasJ. Cowan, Some Policy Bases ofProducts
Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1087-92 (1965); Paul A. LeBel, Intent and Recklessness as
Bases of ProductsLiability: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward,32 ALA. L.REv. 31, 67 (1980). See
also Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ill.
1965) ("The losses caused by [the
product] should be borne by those who have created the risk and reaped the profit by
placing the product in the stream of commerce.").
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have argued that such policies are not applicable outside the context
of manufacturing defects.8

3

Recently, such critics have attacked the

use of strict liability in cases other than those involving manufacturing
defects on the grounds of moral and political philosophy.8 4
The products liability case law reflects this divergence of views
regarding the appropriateness of strict liability in design defect cases.
Some courts steadfastly maintain that strict liability is a distinct theory
of recovery that is completely devoid of any notions of reasonableness
or fault.8 5 Such courts impose liability for defective design regardless
of the manufacturer's exercise of reasonable care in designing the
product.8 6 In contrast, other courts suggest that the evaluation of a
conscious design choice necessarily implicates the knowledge and
conduct of the manufacturer in making that choice. These courts opt
to resolve such questions based on pure negligence principles.8 7 Between the two doctrinal extremes are judges who believe that drawing
any distinction between strict liability and negligence theories, as applied to defective design claims, is futile because the theories are prac88
tically identical in such instances.

For critiques of strict liability, see Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme
Court and the ProductsLiability Crisis: Lessons FromBoyle's Government ContractorDefense, 63 S.
CAL. L. Rv. 639, 640 (1990) ("Critics have argued that the expansion of products liability,
along with its concomitant uncertainty, has driven useful products off the market, stunted
incentives for technological innovation, and harmed the country's ability to compete in
the international marketplace."); Theresa M. Schwartz, ProductLiability Reform by theJudiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 303, 306 (1992) ("the system is out of control because of dramatic
increases in the amount of litigation and in the size of damage awards and because legal
standards are too open-ended and unpredictable for business ... ."); Margaret I. Lyle,
Note, Mass Tort Claims and the CorporateTortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative
Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1297, 1298 (1983) (arguing
that the large awards from product liability suits "might bankrupt a small corporation, for
which the cost of product liability insurance might become prohibitive....").
83 See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183-84 (Mich. 1984); Bolm v.
Triumph Corp., 422 N.Y.S. 2d 969, 973-74 (1979); Fowler v. General Elec. Co., 252 S.E.2d
862, 864 (N.C. 1979); Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 649; Wade, supra note 62, at 836-37
(1973).
84 David G. Owen, The Moral Foundationsof ProductsLiability Law: Toward First Principes, 68 NoTRE DAME L. Rn'. 427 (1993).
85 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456-57 (Cal. 1978).
86 See, e.g., id.
87 See, e.g., Prentis,365 N.W.2d at 185-86 (adopting "a pure negligence, risk-utility test
in products liability actions.., where the liability-is predicated upon defective design").
88 See, e.g., Flamino v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[I]n a
defective design case, there is no practical difference between strict liability and negligence. The test for an unreasonably dangerous condition is equivalent to a negligence
standard of reasonableness.... ."); Campbell v. B.I.C. Corp., 586 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (1992)
("[I]n New York, in a design defect case there is almost no difference between a negligence cause of action and one sounding in strict products liability."); A ProposedRevision,
supranote 6, at 1530-32 ("In our opinion, it is unlikely that the distinction between [strict
liability] and the negligence test is sufficiently significant to warrant the creation of a separate track for liability.").
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The New Restatement A Functional Approach to Product
Defectiveness

C.

After thirty years under section 402A, American products liability
law appears fractured, confusing, and often conflicting. This is especially true for products liability law dealing with design defectiveness.
in response to such confusion, the A.L.I. began drafting the new Restatement as the first chapter of a larger project aimed at providing
stability and clarity in this area of law by rewriting and compiling all of
the liability rules governing product-related injury claims.8 9 In some
respects, this is the first attempt to actually restate American products
liability doctrine. In 1964, Dean Prosser drafted section 402A based
solely on Justice Traynor's reasoning in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.90 and Greenman v. Yuba PowerProducts,Inc., 9 1 and on his own sense
of the law, as a solution to a perceived social problem. 92 By contrast,
the current reporters seek merely to explain and simplify what three
decades ofjudicial evolution has produced: a library of doctrinally inconsistent cases and contentious articles. Hence, according to the reporters, "the time is ripe for a true restatement of products liability
93

law."

The first two sections represent the heart of the new Restatement
and contain the basic liability standards for all consumer products
that are defective at the time of original sale. 94 In order to clarify

existing confusion, or at least to mitigate further confusion, section 2
adopts a functional approach to product defectiveness. First, the section tracks accepted common law practice and recognizes three independent categories of product defects: (1) manufacturing defects;
(2) design defects; (3) and defects based on a manufacturer's failure
to warn. Second, a separate subsection, establishing individual standards for determining when defects are present, addresses each type
of defect. Thus, section 2 establishes exclusive causes of action for
claims of manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn. 95
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 1, at xxvii-xxix (introductory note).
150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
91 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
92 Cf. A ProposedRevision, supra note 6, at 1526; George L. Priest, Strict ProductsLiability:
The Original Intent, 10 CArwozo L. Rnv. 2301, 2311 (1989).
93
See A ProposedRevision, supranote 6. at 1529.
94 The first chapter contains 13 sections. The first three sections define three types of
products defects. The ensuing sections address what is a product, who is a seller, what
losses are covered, the impact of regulatory compliance and noncompliance, liability for
harm caused by prescription drugs and medical devices, liability for defective used products, causation and apportionment of liability in crashworthiness cases, affirmative defenses, and effect of disclaimers on personal injury claims. See generally RESTATEMmNT
89
90

(THIRD) OF TORTS

95

Id. §2.

supra note 1.
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In most respects, the format of section 2 reflects a majority approach. The section, however, rejects the traditional doctrinal categories of negligence and strict liability, in favor of an approach that
96
directly addresses the particular nature of each type of defect.
Although the standard for manufacturing defects remains one of true
strict liability, 9 7 the standards for design and warning defects are predicated on a concept of responsibility, which is tantamount to negligence. 98 However, because the reporters recognize that many courts
insist upon using "strict liability" language even in design and warning
cases, section 2 allows courts to "utilize the terminology of negligence,
strict liability or the implied warranty of merchantability" to characterize legal claims so long as the functional requirements of section 2
have been satisfied. 9 9
The following sections discuss the design defect provision of the
new Restatement in greater detail.
III
DESIGN DEFECTIVENESS UNDER THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
The design defectiveness standard contained in section 2 of the
new Restatement generally embodies majority common law rules. 0 0
Under this standard, design defectiveness is measured using a riskutility analysis to compare the manufacturer's design with any alternative designs proposed by the plaintiff. Liability is imposed if the alternative design would have "reduced the foreseeable risk of harm posed
by the product" at an acceptable cost. 1°1 Comment d, however, contains an exception to this standard which would allow plaintiffs to
reach the trier of fact, even in the absence of an alternative design,
when the manufacturer's design is found to be "manifestly
1 02
unreasonable.'
A. The Risk-Utility Test
Section 2 of the new Restatement explains design defectiveness in
terms of "foreseeable risk of harm," and the availability of a safer "reasonable alternative design." The standard, which is contained in section 2(b), reads:
96 The Reporters state that, "[r]ather than perpetuating confusion spawned by existing doctrinal categories [i.e. strict liability, negligence, and warranty], sections one and
two define the liability for each form of defect in [functional] terms directly addressing the
various kinds of defects." Id. § 1, cmt. a.
97 Id. § 2, cmt. a.
98
Id. cmt. c.
99

100
101
102

Id.

See Thke, supranote 75, at 242-43.
oF TORTS, supra note 1, § 2, cmt. c.
Id. cmt. d.
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(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe[.] 103
Thus, section 2 follows the majority common law rule and adopts a
risk-utility analysis as the sole test for design defectiveness.1 0 4 Specifically, the test is (1) whether a reasonable and financially practical alternative design existed at the time of sale or manufacture which
would have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product, and (2) whether the manufacturer's failure to adopt such a design rendered the product not reasonably safe. 10 5 Section 2 explicitly
rejects all other standards of design defect, including consumer expectations, as independent tests for determining when a product de10 6
sign is defective.
Thus, to evaluate the reasonableness of an "alternative design,"
and to determine whether its omission by the manufacturer renders
the product defective under the new Restatement, the trier of fact must
balance the benefits associated with the competing designs against
103

Id. cmt c.

104 See 2 American Law of Products Liability 3d § 28:11. at 213 (1987 & Supp 1994);
Bimbaum, supra note 66 at 605.
See also, e.g., La. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (West 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3-a(1) (West 1987); Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926
F.2d 1217, 1230 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying Massachusetts's version of products liability law);
Hull v. Eaton, 825 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that "the District of Columbia
would follow the risk/utility balancing test referred to by the Maryland courts"); Townsend
v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 418 (Ala. 1994); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg, Inc., 709 P.2d
876, 879 (Ariz. 1985); Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994); Bond
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 868 P.2d. 1114, 1118 (Colo. CL App. 1993); Nacci v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Radiation Technology,
Inc. v. Ware Const. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983); Banks v. I.C.I. Americas, Inc., 450
S.E.2d 671, 673-74 (Ga. 1994); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 307 (Idaho 1987);
Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457-58 (Ill. 1990); Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139,
1142-43 (Ind. 1990); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Rice, 775 S.W.2d 924, 928-29 (Ky. Ct. App.
1989); St. Germain v. Husqvaraua Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1286 (Me. 1988); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 959 (Md. 1976); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176,
186 (Mich. 1984); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395
A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978); Skyhook Corp. v.Jasper, 560 P.2d 934, 938 (N.M. 1977); Voss v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983); Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.,
391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Pa. 1978); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781
(R.I. 1988); Clayton v. General Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982); Turner v.
General Motors. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert,
542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975); Sims v. General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).
But see Banks & O'Connor, supranote 11, at 413; FrankJ. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of
Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMp. L. REv. 167 (1995).
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs, supra note 1, § 2, cmt c.
106 Id.
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their respective risks of loss or injury. 10 7 To this end, comment e to
section 2 provides a list of ten risk-utility factors that may be considered in the analysis. 108 However, these factors need not exhaust the
inquiry. Moreover, the fact that one factor weighs strongly in favor of

the reasonableness of the design, is not sufficient to ensure that the
manufacturer will escape liability for resulting injuries or loss. Rather,

these factors serve primarily as guideposts to the trier of fact in assessing the fitness of the challenged design.
B.

09

Reasonable Alternative Design

By basing the determination of design defect on a risk-utility comparison between two competing versions of the challenged product,

section 2 makes the existence of an alternative design an essential element of plaintiff's case. The section follows majority law and places

the burden of producing evidence of an alternative on the plaintiff." 0
Moreover, the proposed alternative must reduce the overall level of
risk associated with the product. Courts will not impose liability where
plaintiff's design, if adopted, would have reduced or avoided the risk
of the type of injury suffered, but also would have exposed a different
class of users to risks of greater or equal magnitude."' Such an alternative design would not be considered to be "reasonable" under section 2. Moreover, the proposed alternative must provide a sufficient
107

Id.
Id. § 2, cmt e. The ten factors are: (1) magnitude of foreseeable risk; (2) nature
and strength of consumer expectations; (3) effects of alternative design on cost of production; (4) effects of alternative design in product function; (5) advantages and disadvantages of the proposed safety features; (6) effects on product longevity; (7) maintenance
and repair; (8) esthetics; (9) marketability; and (10) instructions and warnings that accompanied the product. Id.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 418 (Ala. 1994)
("[P]laintiff must prove that a safer, practical, alternative design was available to the manufacturer at the time it manufactured the [product].") (citing General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 402 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985));Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989) ("burden of proof scheme" requires that "plaintiff must prove that a feasible
safer alternative product design existed"); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 872,
378-79 (Mich. 1982) (defendant's motion for directed verdict granted after plaintiff failed
to introduce evidence of "the magnitude of the risks involved and the reasonableness of
the proposed alternative design"); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208
(N.Y. 1983) ("The plaintiff, of course, is under an obligation to present evidence that the
product, as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of
harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner."); Wood v. Ford Motor
Co., 691 P.2d 495, 498 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) ("[P]laintiff must show that an alternative safer
design, practicable under the circumstances, was available.").
See also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (West 1991); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-63
(1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2Al58C-3-a(1) (West 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F)
(Anderson 1987); TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (West 1993); WAsH. REv.
CODE § 7.72.030(1) (West 1992).
111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 2, cmt e.
108
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increase in overall safety to establish causation between the failure to
adopt the design and the plaintiff's injury. As the reporters explain,
" [t] he more marginal the added safety provided by the plaintiff's suggested alternative design, the less likely it is that the suggested alterna112
tive would have played a sufficient causal role."
Although a plaintiff must prove that an overall safer alternative
design existed at the time of manufacture, he need not actually produce a working prototype to demonstrate the proposed design.
Rather, section 2 permits the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case
of design defect using expert testimony as to the alternative design
113
issue.
1. Rejection of CategoricalLiability
Section 2's requirement that plaintiffs pursuing design defect
claims must prove the existence of a reasonable alternative design effectively forecloses the possibility of imposing liability on an entire
product category.' 14 Moreover, the reporters maintain that "courts do
not impose liability based on a conclusion that an entire product category should not have been distributed in the first instance"; rather,
they caution that "the issue is better suited to resolution by legislatures
and administrative agencies that can more appropriately consider
whether distribution of such product categories should be prohibited."11 5 Thus, under section 2, a plaintiff who is injured while diving
into an above-ground pool could not allege that the pool was defectively designed in that the risks associated with all above-ground pools
significantly outweigh their social worth." 6 Section 2 would similarly
protect from liability manufacturers and distributors of other unavoidably high-risk products, such as cigarettes, handguns and alcohol. Of
course, such manufacturers remain subject to liability if the plaintiff
can establish that a manufacturing defect caused his injury, or that the
product could have been designed more safely without unduly affecting its utility. This approach is not only consistent with majority common law rules, but it also accurately follows the position advocated by
7
the reporters for the new Restatement prior to their appointment."
112

Id. § 2, cmt. c.

113

Id.

114 See A ProposedRevision, supra note 6, at 1520 ("By referring explicitly to risk reduction through the adoption of a reasonable-cost, safer design, [section 2(b)] makes clear
that the social risk-utility balancing employed in judging the reasonableness of product
designs will not be undertaken on a categorical basis.").
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF TORTS, supra note 1, § 2, cmt c.
116

Id. § 2, illus. 4.

See, e.g., A ProposedRevision, supra note 6, at 1520-21; Closingthe Frontier,supra note
19, at 1297.
117
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Comment d Caveat

In Tentative Draft No. 2, the reporters added a caveat to the section 2 requirement that plaintiffs must prove that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced their foreseeable risks of injury.
Contained in a new comment d, the caveat leaves open the possibility
of liability without traditional defect in situations where the designs of
the products are "so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low
social utility and high degree of danger, that liability should attach
even absent proof of a reasonable alternative design."'1 8 This caveat
seems to invite the kind of paternalistic judicial scrutiny of products
which the reporters strongly opposed in the past. Indeed, if judges
were to adopt the reasoning of comment d, they would be free to
interfere with consumers' freedom of choice, condemning products
as legally defective because "no rational adult, fully aware of the relevant facts, would [in their opinion] choose to use or consume the
product."119 Thus, while section 2 on its face dismisses the concept of
categorical liability, comment d validates it under limited
circumstances.
Particularly troublesome is comment d's failure to adequately delineate the categories of products which may fall within its scope. Because courts steadfastly reject categorical product liability, the coreporters were unable to substantiate the comment's proposition with
any real-world cases. Instead, they supported it by referring to occasional dicta which contemplates the possible existence of "manifestly
unreasonable" designs, without offering any indication of the characteristics of such designs.' 20 The only possible guidelines for applying
the comment are found in a New Jersey statute referred to in the coreporters' note to section 2. The statute provides that proof of a reasonable alternative design is required, unless the court determines
based on clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) The product is egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous;
(2) The ordinary user or consumer of the product cannot reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the product's risks, or the
product poses a risk of serious injury to persons other than the user
or consumer; and
2
(3) The product has little or no usefulness.' '
Unfortunately, the dearth of cases interpreting this part of the statute
leaves these guidelines functionally useless.
Comment d departs from the' rest of the new Restatement in that it
is the only provision without substantial support among existing prod118
119
120

121

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 1,§ 2, cmt. d.
Id.

Id. see infra, part IV.B.3.

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-3(b) (West 1987).
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ucts liability rules. This departure is explainable in part as a concession to the members of the plaintiffs' bar who, for obvious reasons,
strongly support categorical products liability. Faced with vehement
criticism from the plaintiffs' bar for drafting a prodefendant restatement, the reporters and the A.L.I. agreed to adopt comment d in order to achieve a more balanced result.' 22 Indeed, the language of
comment d tracks an amendment proposed by plaintiffs' lawyer Robert L. Habush at the A.L.I.'s May, 1994 annual meeting. The amendment aimed to significantly modify the alternative design requirement
by excluding from its scope products for which "the extremely high
degree of danger posed by [their] use or consumption so substantially
outweighs its negligible utility that no rational adult, fully aware of the
relevant facts, would choose to use or consume the product."1 2 3
Hence, comment d was clearly intended to keep open the possibility
of consumer challenges to entire categories of unavoidably dangerous
products. In the next section, this Note argues that the A.L.I. should
eliminate comment d from the draft of the new Restatement.
IV
THE CASE AGAINST COMMENT D

Whether the substantive provisions of the new Restatement will become generally accepted rules in American products liability law remains to be seen. There are some indications that courts already view
the liability provisions as highly persuasive authority. 124 In the end,
even if the new Restatement enjoys only a fraction of the success of sec-

tion 402A, it will significantly impact the rights and responsibilities of
manufacturers and consumers. Thus, before the A.L.I. votes on the
final version of the new Restatement, its provisions should not only reflect the current state of the law, but they should also be conceptually
sound. The caveat contained in comment d to section 2, which provides a possible exception to the reasonable alternative design requirement for products with manifestly unreasonable designs, fails
this dual standard.
A.

Comment d and the Limits of the Tort Process
The strength of our commitment to providing consumers with a
fair opportunity to seek compensation for product-related injuries
notwithstanding, we must pay close attention to the abilities and limitations of the means chosen to reach this end. The complex nature of
product design decisions presents an obstacle to the effective realiza122
128

See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
See AL Hesitates, supra note 12, at 2736.
124
See, e.g., Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269, 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994) (referring to Restatement (Third) as support for holding).
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tion of this social ideal because judges and juries often focus exclusively on the overall social value of a product in deciding liability. The
fact that the new Restatement limits this categorical approach to products with "manifestly unreasonable" designs does not resolve the problem. The co-reporters' recognition of the possibility of categorical
liability and their inability to clearly delineate the scope of comment
d's caveat essentially invites the plaintiffs' bar to challenge such socially unpopular products as handguns, alcohol, and cigarettes, and to
pursue manufacturers of other necessarily dangerous products. This
section examines the institutional character of adjudication which limits the courts' ability to referee the social desirability of entire product
categories.
1. Polycentric Problems and the TraditionalApproach to Design
Defectiveness
Legal commentators have long remarked that courts face the
most perplexing problems in cases challenging manufacturers' conscious design decisions. 125 Unlike manufacturing defects, where the
flaw in the product tends to defeat the product's intended function,
design choices reflect the design engineer's deliberate and calculated
judgment to accept certain risks in return for an increase in overall
benefit. 12 6 Therefore, the risks inherent in the final design are an
inseparable element of the product's intended function. As a result,
whereas manufacturing defects can be evaluated against the manufacturer's own production standards, allegations of defective design require courts to supply an external measure of defectiveness.' 2 7 In
125

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LLABiLrTY LAw 84-88 (1980) (judges can-

not make the "multiple, delicate, marginal determinations" necessary to evaluate the costbenefit trade-off); Henderson, supranote 21, at 1577-78 (establishing product safety standards is a polycentric problem best suited for legislative response rather than adjudication). See also Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 865 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984).
126
See Henderson, supranote 21, at 1548 (writing that conscious design defects "originate in the conscious decision of the design engineer to accept the risks associated with the
intended design in exchange for increased benefits or reduced costs").
127 The court recognized this distinction in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443
(Cal. 1978). The court stated:
In general, a manufacturing or production defect is readily identifiable because a defective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product
line .... A design defect, by contrast, cannot be identified simply by comparing the injury-producing product with the manufacturer's plans or with
other units of the same product line, since by definition the plans and all
such units will reflect the same design.
Id. at 454. See also Bowman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law); Prentis,365 N.W.2d at 182. Professor Birnbaum made the following
observation on this difference:
Conscious design defect cases, however, provide no such simple test. Plaintiff is attacking the intended design itself, arguing that the design created
unreasonable risks of harm. In attacking the product's design, the plaintiff
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other words, a court's task in a conscious design case is not to determine whether the product which caused plaintiff's injury was properly
designed, but rather to decide whether the product, as designed by
the manufacturer, violates prevailing social notions of consumer protection. 128 This task requires the court to establish a standard of reasonableness which focuses on the manufacturer's original decision to
accept a certain level of risk associated with a design in exchange for
increased performance, lower costs, or other benefits. Such analysis
necessarily requires the court to weigh various engineering, marketing, and financial factors-a process which by its very nature is ill29
suited to judicial execution.'
Professor Lon L. Fuller described problems such as those involved in reviewing design decisions as inherently polycentric, or involving many possible outcomes which each affect different and
competing factors.' 3 0 Like a spider's web, decisions regarding costbenefit tradeoffs involve many centers for distributing the effects of
pulling a single strand. 13' For example, a change in the composition
of an automobile's chassis may reduce the overall weight of the car
and thus increase its fuel economy, but it may also have less desirable
effects on the car's cost or its ability to withstand collision. Further
complicating the problem is the fact that the design decision implicates cost-benefit interests wholly removed from those immediately involved. Thus, in the above example, the manufacturer's decision also
affects such macro-social interests as pollution control and energy
conservation. Indeed, product design decisions entail society-wide ef-

is not impugning the manufacturer's product as much as the manufacturer's choice of design. The use of the term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," therefore, creates serious analytic problems.
Birnbaum, supra note 66, at 599-600. See generally Henderson, supra note 21, at 1547.
128
SeeHenderson, supranote 21, at 1553 ("In cases involving conscious design choices,
however, plaintiffs are not attacking the means to the ends, but the ends themselves; and
the issue of whether those ends are justifiable entails the balancing of competing
interests.").
129

Id.

130 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-404
(1978).
131 Id. at 395. Fuller characterized as "polycentric," those situations which resemble a
spider web:
A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern
throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of tensions. This would certainly occur,
for example, if the doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker strands
to snap. This is a "polycentric" situation because it is "many centered"each crossing of strands is a distinct center for distributing tensions.
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fects, many of which are unpredictable, i.e., they go beyond the imme3 2
diate manufacturer and its consumers.1
Legal commentators, including one of the reporters for the new
Restatement, expressed initial concern about the ability of courts to engage in the kind of polycentric inquiry entailed in reviewing conscious
design choices.' 3 3 These commentators' concerns have been quieted
over the last two decades, during which design litigation has matured
into an accepted, albeit often schizophrenic, area of law.
2.

Comment d Liability and the PracticalLimits of Adjudication

Supporters of comment d, and of categorical liability in general,
insist that it is merely an extension of the traditional approach to design defectiveness. They argue that because courts have mastered design litigation, they will encounter similar success with balancing the
wide-range of interests implicated by a categorical approach.13 4 However, these commentators ignore the fundamental differences between categorical liability and the traditional approach to design
defectiveness, which compound the polycentricity problems in the assessment of design choices for entire product categories.
a. The TraditionalStandard of "Defect" and Comment d Liability
At the center of traditional products liability doctrine is the idea
that a product must be defective in some way before its manufacturer
132 Fuller's ideas were further explained and developed in James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 469-77 (1976).
133
See Henderson, supra note 54, at 779-80. Professor Henderson observed:
The adjudicatory process is most appropriate for resolving issues by the application of rules sufficiently specific and defined to permit the parties to
argue rationally that a proper application of the rules dictates a certain
result. The adjudicatory process is inadequate as a method of resolving, on
a case-by-case basis, the vague question of whether or not risks presented by
a particular product are unreasonable. When forced to make such decisions, courts must resolve complex and often times highly technical issues
of design alternatives equipped only with legal principle reduced to its most
basic degree of generalization: a balancing test. In effect, the courts are
forced to second-guess the designers; they are forced to redesign the product themselves. The result is to push the adjudicatory process to the brink
of arbitrariness.
Id. (foomotes omitted). See also EPSTEIN, supranote 125, at 84-90 (agreeing with Professor
Henderson). For judicial concurrence with this criticism, see Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.,
630 F.2d 950, 962-63 (3d. Cir. 1980) (recognizing in dictum that design decisions are
polycentric), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
For explicit rejection of this view, see MARSHALL SHAo, THE LAW OF PRODucTs LWEBILrry J[ 9.09[2], at 9-15 (1987) ("a [properly instructed] jury can perform the necessary balancing test as well as any individual or agency"); Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse
of Warnings in ProductLiability: Design Defect LitigationComes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495,
at 525-28 (1976) (design defect cases are not truly polycentric and courts are competent to

judge them). See also Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242, 245-46
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
134 See, e.g., Turley, supra note 23, at 49-54.
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will be held legally responsible for injuries resulting from its use.
Although individuals still debate the precise meaning of the term "defect" in the context of conscious design, the general concept of "defect" is an accepted part of American products liability law.' 3 5 Indeed,
courts have unanimously rejected absolute liability for product-related
injuries and the view that manufacturers are insurers of their products' safety.' 3 6 By requiring that the product be defective before imposing liability, courts have refused to second-guess every
manufacturer's decision which results in a residuum of risk. Rather,
courts have opted for a less intrusive approach which merely encourages manufacturers to consider the risks and benefits of available alternative designs and to select the alternative that most accurately
reflects society's notion of reasonable product safety. Only if the manufacturer's choice is later found to be unreasonable within that framework will courts hold it responsible for any injuries caused by the
product's design.137
By conditioning liability on a finding of defect, courts have declined to regulate product availability and have refused to declare that
certain types of products desired by consumers are simply bad for
them. Instead of embracing what would amount to judicial prohibition, courts have left some of the responsibility for product-related
injuries on consumers who chose to use a particular product. 3 8 In
essence, courts have opted to forgo paternalistic arrogance in favor of
encouraging safe product use.' 3 9 Thus, with respect to conscious design choices, the traditional concept of "defect" reflects a balanced
approach to consumer safety. On the one hand, it encourages manufacturers to distribute products that are as safe as reasonably possible;
on the other hand, it declines to interfere with the consumers' freedom of choice by unduly inhibiting product availability.
This balanced framework for design liability has played a paramount role in rendering manufacturers' conscious design decisions
135

See, e.g., Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1985)

("[T]he manufacturer is liable for injuries resulting from a product only if that product is
'defective'-i.e.," has something wrong with it.); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377
P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) ("A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being."); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655,
659 (Wash. 1986) ("Where there are no design or manufacturing defects in the product,
and where the warnings concerning its use are adequate, a manufacturer is not liable for
an accident and resulting injuries.").
136 See, e.g., Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., 325 S.E.2d 465, 467-68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Owens
v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 379 (Mich. 1982); Richardson v. Holland, 741
S.W.2d 751, 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
'37
See supra part IIIA
138
SeeJAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. Twmsiu, PRODUCTS LLABILITY, PROBLEMS
AND PRocEss 491-557 (1992).
139 Id.
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adjudicable within the institutional bounds of the tort system. To effect the appropriate allocation of responsibility between manufacturers and product users, courts have increasingly turned to a risk-utility
analysis with an emphasis on the availability of a reasonable alternative
design. 140 Specifically, this approach provides the courts with a workable process for evaluating complex design decisions by supplying a
series of objectively verifiable risk-utility factors and a means of using
those factors to compare the product design at issue and the proposed
alternative. 14 ' A given product is deemed defective in design only
where the proposed alternative would have reduced the product's
foreseeable risks of harm without unreasonably affecting its utility. 42
By making liability conditional on the availability of an overall safer
alternative design, this process allows the courts to maintain a proper
balance between safety concerns and product availability and narrows
the focus ofjudicial inquiry to a risk and benefit comparison between
the design in question and the proposed alternative. The extent of
judicial interference with manufacturers' decisions and consumer
choice is thus reduced to marginal changes in the product.
The potential for categorical liability embodied in comment d to
section 2 of the new Restatement rejects the traditional defect standard
and ignores the accepted allocation of responsibility between manufacturers and product users by authorizing courts and juries to decide
the social desirability of entire categories of products. As such, it
broadens the scope ofjudicial inquiry to include social considerations
which the courts did not have to address under the traditional approach. For example, in order to accurately assess the overall social
benefit of a product, courts will have to consider the potential economic effects of removing the entire product category from the market. In the past, courts have expressly rejected such evidence as
irrelevant to determining whether a product design is defective and
thus inadmissible in products liability cases.' 43 Likewise, comment d
would require the courts to assess the net value of various categories
140
See supra note 104 and accompanying text. See also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating that each design case requires "a delicate balancing of many factors"); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. 1985)
(adopting risk-utility where no consumer expectations exist on a complex design); Light v.
Weldarc Co., 569 So. 2d 1302, 1304 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that risk-utility
balancing is required to give accurate meaning to "unreasonably dangerous" in a design
context).
141 James A. Henderson; Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of American Producs Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. RE 1332, 1334 (1991) (stating that "[o] nly risk-utility balancing can serve as a workable standard for defining defect"); Henderson, supranote 54, at
774-78.
142
See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
143 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D. NJ. 1986) (holding
that a product's utility may not "be established by looking to whether the defendant 'reasonably' believed that its profits would be sufficient to maintain a livelihood, hire employ-
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of products to consumers of those products. Even if the courts could
obtain the relevant data, it is unlikely that any judge or jury would be
able to perform the necessary balancing of all of the competing interests within the confines of a traditional trial.'4
Thus, the problem with comment d is that it goes far beyond existing design liability doctrine. Rather than expanding the concept of
defect, comment d eliminates it and, as such, removes the constraints
on judicial inquiry which made adjudication of design claims possible
in the first place. If their analysis goes beyond a comparison of the
relative risks and benefits of different versions of the same product,
the courts will undoubtedly become caught up in the web of interests
affected by entire categories of products.
b.

The Courts are the Wrong Forum to Address the Social
Desirability of Entire Product Categories

Some have described the potential impact of categorical liability
as being tantamount to a death warrant for any industry that supplies
a product which could be declared legally defective because of its
high-risk character. 145 Although such a characterization may overstate the practical effects of comment d, the application thereof would
undoubtedly interfere with the operations of affected companies, and
would severely restrict the availability of the products at issue. In light
of these potentially severe consequences, one should consider
whether the judicial system is the proper forum for resolving comment d-type cases, or whether resolution of such polycentric issues
should be left to the legislatures.
Proponents of categorical liability assume that the courts can conduct the type of broad evaluation necessary to assess the overall social
desirability of entire categories of products. 14 6 However, the judicial
process is not designed to perform the extensive investigations required to accurately resolve such polycentric issues. 14 7 Rather, it
148
merely focuses on the past conduct of the parties before the court.
This is not to say that judges never consider future occurences in
reaching their decisions. Indeed, judges may, and often do, take soees, or pay taxes"). Instead, the benefits to consumers may only be balanced against the
risk to those consumers. Id. at 289-90.
144 See Henderson, supra note 21, at 1547.
145 See Closing the Frontier,supranote 19, at 1314. See also Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
146 See supra text accompanying notes 148-44.
147 See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985);
Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 658 (Wash. 1986). See generally Harvey M.
Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 385
(1995) (asserting categorical liability has no place in American products liability doctrine).
148 Lillian R. BeVier, Judicial Restraint:An Argument from InstitutionalDesign, 17 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 11 (1994).
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called legislative facts into account. 14 9 The judiciary, however, lacks
the instruments or techniques needed to ascertain and evaluate vast
amounts of relevant social and behavioral data. This limitation is perpetuated by a system-wide antagonism toward the idea ofjudicial lawmaking, as well as by restrictive rules of evidence and procedure
aimed at preserving traditional types of adjudication. 150 One judge
articulated this problem in the context of product category liability:
"If mini-trail bikes are to be declared illegal in this state, the Legislature, which can hold public hearings and consider all viewpoints and
51
aspects of the matter, is the appropriate body to decide."'
In addition to the procedural limits on the courts' fact-gathering
capabilities, the judiciary is subject to other institutional limitations
which render it less capable than other institutions to address highly
polycentric issues. Adjudication is primarily concerned with resolving
disputes regarding the rights and responsibilities of parties to particular lawsuits. As one commentator observed, framing issues in terms of
rights naturally leads to outcomes with an "on/off' quality. 152 In
other words, the product is either defective, in which case the injured
consumer is entitled to compensation, or the product is not defective,
in which case the consumer is precluded from recovering. Polycentric
problems, on the other hand, ordinarily implicate a wide range of potential outcomes, each involving tradeoffs between conflicting social
values. 153 This predicament is best illustrated by the Swine Flu vaccine
dilemma in the 1970s, where Congress made a full and fair determina54
tion that the overall benefits of the vaccine were worth the risks.'
From an institutional perspective, such a solution would not have
been possible through adjudication.
Moreover, if the solutions to highly polycentric problems are to
be sustained, the wide range of social interests implicated requires
that such solutions are reached through a politically legitimate process. Legal process theorists have long counseled against the use of
the judicial process to achieve such macro-social policies. 155 Focusing
149 See Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the AdministrativeProcess,
55 HARv.L REv. 364, 402-04 (1942).
150

See, e.g., DONALD L. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 47-51 (1977).

151
152

Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 658 (Wash. 1986).
See David L Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 553

(1988).
153

Fuller, supra note 130, at 393-95. Fuller demonstrates this through an analogy of

the problem of assigning football players to positions on a team. There are a large number
of possible outcomes, and the assignment of each player to any one position has an effect
on the optimal positions for other team members. Id. at 395.
154 See genera//y Nina S. Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980 B.Y.U. L.
Ra,. 69 (discussing congressional response to Swine Flu epidemic).
155
See, e.g., DONALD L. HORowrTz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 298 (1977); GERALD
N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE:

CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 343
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on the principal division of power between the courts and the legislature, these theorists argue that the political independence of federal
judges deprives such judges of legitimacy once they move into the
realm of promoting social policy. 156 Thus, the resolution of polycentric problems should be left to the legislature, because its composition
and deliberative processes are better suited to achieving a social consensus. In the products liability context, this conclusion is underscored by the historically swift legislative responses overriding judicial
157
findings of product category liability.
In sum, the judicial process is not equipped to serve as a referee
in debates over the social desirability of entire product categories.
Moreover, the concept of categorical liability contained in comment d
presumes an institutional legitimacy to resolve such issues that is simply not present. The judiciary's nearly unanimous rejection of cate-

gorical liability, as discussed in the next section, suggests that it too is
aware that issues affecting whole categories of products should be left
to the legislature.
B.

Comment d is Unsupported by Case Law

In recent years, a significant number of plaintiffs have approached the courts, arguing that the traditional concept of defect
should not apply to certain high-risk categories of products. Although
these plaintiffs advanced no particular rationale for selecting product
categories for such special treatment, their targets have included cigarettes, 58s alcoholic beverages, 15 9 handguns, 16 0 above-ground pools, 161
and all-terrain vehicles. 162 With only three exceptions, 165 the courts
have emphatically rejected these unconventional arguments and reas(1991); BeVier, supra note 148, at 10-12; Lino A. Graglia, DoJudgesHave a Policy-MakingRole
in the American System of Government, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 124-27 (1994).
156 A problem with governmental power to enact "good" social policies without
popular consent is that it necessarily includes the power to enact "bad" social policies without popular consent. Even more fundamentally, the essence of a system of government based on the consent of the governed is
that the question of whether a social policy is "good" gets answered by the
governed.
Graglia, supranote 155, at 124.
157 See infra part IV.B.2.
158
See, e.g., Kolter v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D. Mass. 1990), affd,
926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992); Gianitsis v. American Brands,
Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 855 (D.N.H. 1988); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149,
1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
159 See Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 568-70 (Iowa 1986).
160 See Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying California law); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1266 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana
law); Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
161
See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (NJ. 1983).
162 See Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 658 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
165 See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
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serted the conceptual soundness of the traditional requirement of defect. In the three instances in which courts embraced the idea of
categorical liability, state legislatures quickly enacted statutes reversing
the courts.'6 The clear implication is that the judiciary and the legislatures recognize that categorical product liability falls within the legislatures' sphere of governance. In the end, comment d finds its sole
judicial support in dicta traceable to a single footnote. 65
1. JudicialReluctance to Embark on CategoricalLiability
In seeking to hold manufacturers and suppliers accountable for
injuries resulting from the use of their products, even in the absence
of a safer alternative design, plaintiffs have often relied on one or
both of the following conceptual approaches. First, plaintiffs have
sought to extend the conventional risk-utility balancing test to entire
product categories. 16 6 Second, plaintiffs have argued for strict liability
where manufacturers and distributors of selected categories of highrisk products are engaged in ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous
activities.1 67 With a few notable exceptions, both approaches have
been emphatically rejected by the courts.
a. Attempts at a CategoricalApplication of the Risk-Utility Test
As traditionally applied, risk-utility balancing considers the desirability of competing designs of the same product, rather than the desirability of the product itself.168 Professor Wade was the first to suggest
expanding this approach and using it to evaluate the generic usefulness of an entire line of products. 69 To this end, Professor Wade
proposed a list of seven factors the courts should consider in determining whether a product was "reasonably safe." 170 Although the
manufacturer's ability to reduce or eliminate the risks inherent in the
164

165
166
167
168
169

knives).

See infra part IV.B.2.
See infra part IV.B.3.
See infra part 1V.B.I.a.
See infra part IV.B.1.b.
See suprapart IIlA.
SeeWade, supranote 62, at 844 (discussing unavoidably dangerous products such as

170
Dean Wade proposed that courts, in reaching a conclusion about a product's risk
and utility, should consider:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product ....
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
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product by adopting an alternative design is one of the seven factors
in Wade's approach, it is not a threshold requirement for liability. In
recent years, a number of plaintiffs have urged the application of this
approach to product categories posing a high risk of injury in order to
determine whether the risks outweigh the social usefulness of the
products, and thus whether their manufacturers should be held accountable for any resulting injuries. 171 In essence, they want judges
and juries to consider whether a product is so dangerous that it
should not have been marketed at all.
The steadfast judicial response to demands for categorical products liability has been an emphatic refusal to depart from the requirements of the traditional defect-based approach. 7 2 By characterizing
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability ....
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 837-38.
'71
See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986) (no
liability imposed on gun manufacturer because no design defects); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp.,
762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (no liability under risk-utility test); Gunsalus v. Celotex
Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (no recovery on risk-utility theory); Patterson v.
Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (no liability despite assertion
that handguns are unreasonably dangerous); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d
516 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (refusing to impose liability in absence of reasonable alternative design); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983) (imposing liability even
though no alternative design was available); Baughn v. Honda Moter Co., 727 P.2d 655
(Wash. 1986) (en banc) (considering risks associated with mini-trail bikes).
172
See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying Massachusetts law to cigarettes), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215, reaffid on remand, 981 F.2d 7
(1st Cir. 1992); Shipman, 791 F.2d at 1534 (applying Florida law to handguns); Moore v
R1G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying California law to handguns); Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268 (applying Louisiana law to handguns); Gunsalus, 674 F.
Supp. at 1159 (applying Pennsylvania law to cigarettes); Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F.
Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (applying Ohio law to handguns), affd, 849 F.2d 608 (6th
Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. N.M. 1987) (applying New
Mexico law to handguns), aff'd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at
1209 (applying Texas law to handguns); Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236, 240
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (manufacturer not liable for injuries caused by .22 caliber rifle),
overruled on othergrounds, Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 360 (Colo. 1992); Delahanty v.
Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C. 1989) (rejecting application of "abnormally dangerous
activity" doctrine to handguns), affd, 900 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (I1. App. Ct. 1985) (handguns not "unreasonably dangerous" under consumer expectation test); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d
751, 756-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting strict liability effect of doctrine); Baughn, 727
P.2d at 661 (no manufacturer liability for mini-trail bikes); see also Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988) (cigarettes not "unreasonably dangerous");
Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (no strict liability for
guns); Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 486 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (no
liability for shotguns if not defective); King v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990) (no liability for handguns if not defective); Koepke v. Crossman Arms Co.,
582 N.E.2d 1000, 1001 (Ohio App. 1989) (risk-benefit test inapplicable); Dauphin Deposit
Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (rejecting risk-utility test in case involving alcoholic beverages); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
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categorical liability as a form ofjudicially-imposed prohibition, courts
have frequently commented that it falls outside of their realm of competence. 173 In Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 174 for example, the

Supreme Court of Washington heard the appeal of a case involving
two young boys who were injured while riding a mini-trail bike on a
public roadway. The plaintiff, a parent of one of the boys, urged the
court to consider the risks and benefits of the entire line of mini-trail
bikes in determining whether Honda should be held responsible for
the boys' injuries. 175 In affirming ajudgment for the defendant, the
court refused to abandon traditional strict liability principles and impose liability "[w]here there are no design or manufacturing defects
in the product, and where the warnings concerning its use are adequate .... -"176 Moreover, the court characterized the approach advocated by the plaintiff as "transform[ing] strict product liability into
absolute liability,"'177 explicitly noting that declaring a product illegal
is a decision that should properly be left to the state's legislature. 178
Although Baughn involved a relatively innocuous product, categorical liability has been similarly denounced by courts confronted
with challenges to more socially vilified products, such as handguns
and cigarettes. For instance, in Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft,179 the

mother of a murder victim brought a products liability claim against
the manufacturer of the handgun used by the assailant. Acknowledging that the handgun was not defective in the traditional sense, that it
performed as intended, and that it was equipped with all of the necessary safety features, the plaintiff urged instead that the gun was defective "in its design because handguns simply pose risks of injury and
death that 'far outweigh' any social utility they may have."' 80 Referring to this argument as "delightfully nonsensical," 18 the court reiterated that in the context of design defectiveness, the risk-utility
balancing test does not apply unless the challenged defect could have
been remedied by adopting a reasonable alternative design. 8 2 MoreCo., 578 A.2d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (rejecting "inherently dangerous" test for
cigarettes), appealdenied, 593 A.2d 842 (Pa. 1991).
173 See, e.g., Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1216 ("[T]he judicial system is, at best, illequipped .... [Tihis is a matter for the legislatures, not the courts."); Baughn, 727 P.2d at
658 ("[T]he Legislature, which can hold public hearings and consider all viewpoints and
aspects of the matter, is the appropriate body to... decide.").
174
175

727 P.2d 655 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).

181

Id. at 660.
1d. at 659.
Id. at 660 (citation omitted).
Id. at 658.
608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Text. 1985).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1211.

182

Id. at 1212.

176

177
17?

179
180
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over, the court expressed particular concern about maintaining a
proper symmetry between legislative and judicial acts:
[Plaintiffs claim] is a misuse of tort law, a baseless and tortured
extension of products liability principles. And, it is an obvious attempt-unwise and unwarranted, even if understandable-to ban
or restrict handguns through courts and juries, despite the repeated
Congress to pass strong, comprerefusals of state legislatures and
183
hensive gun-control measures.
In Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp.,184 plaintiff, a smoker who developed
lung cancer after approximately forty-five years of smoking defendant's cigarettes, argued, inter alia, that he should be able to recover
in strict liability "because the risks caused by cigarettes outweigh their
social utility.11 85 Here too, the court declined to subject an entire
product category to risk-utility analysis, noting that doing so would
turn suppliers into insurers of their products' safety.' 8 6 Like the
Baughn and Pattersoncourts, this court felt that such decisions are beyond the institutional bounds of the judiciary, declaring that: "[categorical liability] impermissibly allows judges to decide cases based
upon their own views of social or personal utility. Whether products
should be banned or whether absolute liability should be imposed for
their use are determinations more appropriately made by the legisla87
tive branch of government."
b.

The "UltrahazardousActivity" Approach

Courts have long imposed liability without regard to reasonable
care upon actors who engage in ultrahazardous 8 8 or abnormally dangerous activities.' 8 9 In a seminal case, Rylands v. Fletcher' 90 the House
of Lords held the defendant liable for flooding plaintiffs coal mine
despite the fact that the defendant had exercised all reasonable care
in maintaining a water reservoir. Invariably, after falling to persuade
the courts to expand the traditional defect standard by weighing the
risks and benefits of entire product categories, plaintiffs in products
cases beseeched the courts to apply the ultrahazardous activity doctrine to products posing a high degree of unavoidable risk.' 9 ' Argu183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 1208.
674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-524 (1938).
See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-524A (1965).

190

1 Ex. 256 (1866), affd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).

191

See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.

1984) (rejecting attempt to impose strict liability for sale of nondefective product); Burkett
v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118, 120 n.3 (Or. 1985) (plaintiffs alleged that manuflacture of handguns was "ultrahazardous").
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ing that manufacture and distribution of such high-risk products as
handguns or cigarettes should be deemed ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities, these plaintiffs sought to hold the defendant manufacturers accountable for any injuries resulting from use of
their products despite the absence of defect in the traditional sense.
In considering this proposed extension of the ultrahazardous activity doctrine, the courts have consistently held it inapplicable to the
manufacture and distribution of high-risk products.' 92 The courts
usually point to three characteristics which differentiate distribution
of products from situations envisioned by the Court in Rylands. First,
the scope of the ultrahazardous activity doctrine is generally limited to
certain inherently dangerous nonnatural activities involving land,
such as blasting, storing large quantities of water, and storing explosives. A person who engages in such use of his land is held to have
assumed all of the risks involved, and he cannot escape liability merely
by showing that he has exercised all reasonable care. Courts in products cases have accepted this land-based requirement on its face.
Thus, where the manufacture and distribution of products involves
land only in a tangential manner, courts have refused to subject man193
ufacturers and distributors to the ultrahazardous activity doctrine.
Second, a major rationale behind Rylands and other decisions involving ultrahazardous activities is the idea that when an actor creates
a risk against which others cannot protect themselves, he alone must
bear the ultimate responsibility for any resulting harm.19 4 As between
two parties, it seems intuitive that the party who exposes the other to a
192
See, e.g., Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying California law to handguns); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1266 (5th Cir.
1985) (applying Louisiana law to handguns); Martin,743 F.2d at 1203-05 (applying Illinois
law to handguns); Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 531-32 (S.D. Ohio 1987)
(applying Ohio law to handguns), affd, 849 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam,
Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 774 (D.N.M. 1987) (applying New Mexico law to handguns), affd,
843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Hammond v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 565 A.2d 558,
563 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (handguns); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C.
1989) (rejecting application of "abnormally dangerous activity doctrine" to handguns),
affd, 900 F.2d 368; Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (no
manufacturer liability for guns); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d
1293, 1297-98 (I1. App. Ct. 1985) (handguns not "unreasonably dangerous"); Maguire v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 568-70 (Iowa 1986) (beer); Richardson v. Holland,
741 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting strict liability effect of doctrine); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118, 120 (Or. 1985) (handguns); Knott v. Liberty
Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (handguns).
193 See, e.g., Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1267-68 (applying Louisiana law); Martin, 743 F.2d at
1203-04 (applying Illinois law); Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 531-32 (applying Ohio law); Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297; Richardson, 741 S.W.2d at 755; Burkett, 704 P.2d at 120-21.
194 See Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
Judge Blackburn's opinion from the Exchequer Chamber noted:
[T]here is no ground for saying that the plaintiff here took upon himself
any risk arising from the uses to which the defendants should choose to
apply their land. He neither knew what these might be, nor could he in
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risk of injury or loss should be held accountable for the consequences
of his actions. This rationale, however, does not extend to those who
supply the instrumentalities used as part of the high-risk activity. In
most instances, such suppliers provide a common product which is
non-dangerous in itself, and which does not become hazardous until
it is used by the buyer. Accordingly, although courts have applied the
ultrahazardous activity doctrine to those whose use of certain products
poses an unreasonable risk, they have consistently refused to apply it
95
to those who merely supply such products.
Finally, for the ultrahazardous activity doctrine to apply, the activity in question must be unusual or nonnatural. 196 The doctrine is applicable if,as in Rylands, one party engages in activity or conduct
197
which is not a matter of common usage under the circumstances.
In conducting unusual activities, a party generates risks that others
cannot expect and thus cannot protect against, thereby justifying the
imposition of strict liability for resulting injuries. The manufacture
and distribution of products, however, is a common activity, which
does not fall within the scope of this doctrine. This proposition is true
regardless of the magnitude of the product's inherent risk of injury.
As the court in Caveny v. Raven Arms Co. pointed out in the context of
handguns: 'Without a doubt manufacturing and distributing handguns is a matter of common usage. Indeed, approximately two mil198
lion handguns are sold annually."
In addition to their recognition of the conceptual mismatch between the ultrahazardous activity doctrine and categorical liability,
courts addressing this issue have also voiced concerns about the openendedness of the doctrine, 199 as well as the legitimacy ofjudicial interany way control the defendants, or hinder their building what reservoirs
they liked, and storing up in them what they pleased ....
Id. at 287.
195 See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.
1984) (noting the difference between the dangerous use of a handgun and its manufacture and sale); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C. 1989) ("[H]andgun marketing cannot be classified as abnormally dangerous.").
196
See, e.g., Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 532 (applying Ohio law to handguns); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp 771, 774 (D. N.M. 1987) (applying New Mexico law to handguns),
affd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988).
197
See e.g., City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.SA, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo.
1981) (storage of large amounts of gasoline near residential area); Lutheringer v. Moore,
190 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (fumigation using poisonous gases); Largan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567
P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (crop spraying).
198 Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 532 (citation omitted).
199 The Perkins court voiced its fear as follows:
There is also nothing inherent in the logic of the arguments that would
prevent their application to the manufacturers of any instrumentality that
can be used dangerously, such as knives, lead pipes, explosives,
automobiles, alcohol, and rolling pins. Indeed, most consumer products
marketed to the general public have both legitimate and harmful uses. We
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ference with product availability. The court in Martin v. Harrington&
Richardson,Inc. explained its refusal to apply the ultrahazardous activity doctrine to handguns with the following statement:
[The right] to bear arms is protected, at least against all restrictions
except those imposed by the police power, by the Illinois Constitution.... The State of Illinois regulates, but does not ban, the possession of handguns by private citizens.... Imposing liability for
the sale of handguns, which would in practice drive manufacturers
out of business, would produce a handgun ban byjudicial fiat in the
face of the decision by Illinois to allow its citizens to possess
20 0
handguns.
The courts' conclusive refusal to expand both the traditional riskutility test and the ultrahazardous activity doctrine to encompass
whole product categories is strong evidence of the conceptual failure
of categorical liability. Moreover, the manner of this refusal strongly
suggests that the judiciary is well aware that such issues are for the
legislature to resolve.
2.

Legislative Repudiation ofjudicial Experiments With Categorical
Liability

Despite the judiciary's general reluctance to embark upon categorical liability, a few plaintiffs did find judges who were receptive to
their arguments. Specifically, three courts have allowed plaintiffs to
state a cause of action in strict liability absent proof of reasonable alternative design: (1) the Supreme Court of New Jersey in O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp.;2 0 (2) the Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley v. R.G.
Industries,Inc.;20 2 and (3) the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Halphen
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.203 In each instance, the legislatures of the
respective states responded by enacting products liability statutes consistent with traditional doctrine.
O'Brien, a 1983 decision, was the first and most celebrated judicial
decision to extend the risk-utility analysis to a product category and to
impose design defect liability where the product was not defective in
the traditional sense. The case involved an appeal of a products liability suit filed by a young man who was paralyzed after diving head first
into a neighbor's above-ground swimming pool. The plaintiff concannot accept the argument that the manufacturer should become an insurer of all uses of those products, both legitimate and illegitimate, simply
by virtue of having marketed them.
Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1269.
200
Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
201
463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1988).
202
497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
203
484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
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tended that his injuries resulted when he dove into the pool and the
slippery bottom of the pool caused his hands to slip apart, thereby
allowing his head to strike the bottom. 2 0 4

In seeking to recover

against both the manufacturer and the retail seller, he argued that the
vinyl used by the manufacturer to line the bottom of the pool was so
slippery as to constitute a design defect, even though plaintiff was un20 5
able to show that an alternative, less slippery material was available.
The defendant contended that this failure of proof barred plaintiffs
claim under accepted principles of design defect doctrine.
In rejecting the defendant's arguments, the NewJersey Supreme
Court relied on Professor Wade's approach and asserted that the existence of an alternative design is only one factor to be considered in
evaluating a product's defectiveness.2 0 6 Viewing the evidence
presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court
concluded:
To establish sufficient proof to compel submission of the issue to
the jury for appropriate fact-finding under risk-utility analysis, it was
not necessary for plaintiff to prove the existence of alternative, safer
designs.... [E]ven if there are no alternative methods of making
have found that the
bottoms for above-ground pools, the jury might
207
risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility.
The court thus concluded that certain products with no alternative
designs may be so inherently dangerous and so socially useless that,
under the risk-utility approach, their manufacturers should be held
accountable for any resulting injuries.
Advocates of categorical liability found O'Brien's bold departure
from the traditional defect standard quite attractive. Any euphoria,
however, was quite brief. In 1987, the New Jersey legislature passed a
statute which effectively overturned the O!Brien rule and reestablished
the existence of a reasonable alternative design as a threshold element
20 8
of design defect claims.
Kelley v. R.G. Industries,Inc.,20 9 decided by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in 1985, was the second judicial attempt at categorical liability. In Kelley, the plaintiff was injured when an unidentified assailant
shot him during an armed robbery. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a
products liability claim against the manufacturer of the handgun used
in the shooting. He alleged, inter alia, that the gun, which is commonly referred to as a "Saturday Night Special," was defectively
204
205

O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 302.
Id.

206
207

Id. at 306.

208

NJ.

Id.
STAT. ANN.

§ 2A.580-3 (West 1987). See also Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645

A.2d 1269 (N.J. Super. 1994) (applying § 2A.58C-3).
209
497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
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designed.2 1 0 Unlike the O'Brien court, the court in Kelley rejected the
risk-utility analysis and the imposition of strict liability.2 11 Nevertheless, after an extensive review of Maryland's anti-gun legislation and its
underlying policies, the court stated that it would be "entirely consistent with public policy to hold the manufacturers and marketers of
Saturday Night Special handguns strictly liable to innocent persons
who suffer gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products."2 1 2 Viewing the chief purpose of Saturday Night Special handguns as facilitating criminal activity, the court concluded that strict
liability was warranted under the circumstances.2 1 3 The court relegated to individual judges and juries the task of determining which
214
weapons fell within the "Saturday Night Special" category.
Although the path to categorical liability chosen by the Kelley
court differed markedly from the rationale of O'Brien, the legislative
response was the same. Three years after the court's decision, the
Maryland legislature prohibited the imposition of strict liability
against manufacturers and distributors of firearms subsequently used
215
in criminal activities.
The third case, Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., plaintiffs'
third and last success with categorical liability, involved a wrongful
death action brought by the widow of a shipyard worker who contracted cancer of the lining of the lung from repeated exposure to
asbestos products supplied by the defendant.2 1 6 In responding to a
certified question, the Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized that
some types of products may be "unreasonably dangerous per se," and
that manufacturers of such products may be held strictly liable for
resulting injuries "solely on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of
210
Id. at 1145.
211 Id. at 1149. The court refused to extend the risk-utility analysis to "impose liability
on the maker or marketer of a handgun which has not malfunctioned." Id.

212
213

Id. at 1159.
Id.

214

Id. at 1159-60. The court wrote:
There is no clear-cut, established definition of a Saturday Night Special,
although there are various characteristics which are considered in placing a
handgun into that category. Relevant factors include the gun's barrel
length, concealability, cost, quality of materials, quality of manufacture, accuracy, reliability, whether it has been banned from import by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and other related characteristics. Additionally, the industry standards, and the understanding among law enforcement personnel, legislators and the public, at the time the weapon was
manufactured and/or marketed by a particular defendant, must be considered. Because many of these factors are relative, in a tort suit a handgun
should rarely, if ever, be deemed a Saturday Night Special as a matter of
law. Instead, it is a finding to be made by the trier of facts.

Id
215

216

of 1957 art. 27, § 36-1 (1995 Supp.).
484 So. 2d 110, 112 (La. 1986).
MD. ANN. CODE
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the product. ",217 The court termed this approach "the purest form of
strict liability,"2 18 and reserved it for product categories with respect to
which "a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of
the product, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the
product. 2 19 However, as in NewJersey and Maryland, the court's venture into categorical liability was promptly rebuffed by the legislature.
In 1988, two years after Halphenwas decided, the Louisiana legislature
adopted legislation expressly requiring proof of a reasonable alterna2 20
tive design in all design defect cases.
The fact that legislatures have decisively overridden every instance of judicial imposition of categorical liability demonstrates the
legislatures' cognizance of their exclusive responsibility to act in that
area. This, in itself, is a strong argument for rejecting judicial evaluation of entire product categories.
3.

The Infamous Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp. Footnote

Comment d is not utterly withoutjudicial support. Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp.2 2 1 was the first judicial decision to suggest that under
limited circumstances plaintiffs need not present evidence of a reasonable alternative design, thus implying that the traditional concept of
defect is not universally applicable. In Wilson, the Oregon Supreme
Court heard the manufacturer's appeal of a products liability suit filed
following the crash of a small airplane which killed four of its occupants and injured another. Plaintiffs, the personal representatives of
two of the passengers killed in the crash, alleged, inter alia, that the
airplane was defective in design because its carbureted engine was
overly susceptible to icing and a fuel-injected engine would have prevented the accident. 222 In addressing the sufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence, the court found that the evidence presented was insufficient to
prove that a fuel-injected engine was "not only technically feasible but
also practicable in terms of cost and the overall design and operation
of the [airplane] ."223 The court remanded the case for a new trial,
emphasizing that evidence of a reasonable alternative design "is part
.,224
of the required proofthat a design feature is a 'defect'
217

Id. at 113.
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Id. at 114.
Id.
220
A. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 9:2800.56-2800.59 (West 1991). The statute does not, however, apply retroactively. See Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (La.

1991).
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577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978).

224

Id. at 1327 (emphasis added).

Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1327.
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Given the absolute nature of its holding, the Wilson court attempted to mitigate its impact on injured consumers. In an oftencited footnote, the court explained the risk-utility approach it
adopted:
[T]he court's task is to weigh the factors bearing on the utility and
the magnitude of risk and to determine whether, on balance, the
case is a proper one for submission to the jury.... There may be
cases in which the jury would be permitted to hold the defendant
liable on account of a dangerous design feature even though no
safer design was feasible (or there was no evidence of a safer practicable alternative). If, for example, the danger was relatively severe
and the product had only limited utility, the court might properly
conclude that the jury could find that a reasonable manufacturer
would not have introduced such a product into the stream of
2 25
commerce.
Although no court outside of Oregon has expressly adopted the
Wilson footnote, a number of courts have echoed its reasoning. For
example, in Armentraut v. FMC Corp.2 26 the Colorado Supreme Court
cited Wilson for the proposition that although plaintiffs challenging
the design of a product must, as a general rule, present evidence of a
safer and reasonable alternative design, such evidence may not always
be necessary.22 7 Similarly, although Minnesota follows the majority
approach requiring proof of a safer alternative design, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co.22 8 relied on Wilson for its
statement that " [ c] onceivably, rare cases may exist where the product
may be judged dangerous because it should be removed from the
market rather than redesigned." 22 9 Additionally, the NewJersey legislature codified this potential exception in its products liability
23 0
statute.
The implication of Wilson and its progeny is that courts may impose categorical liability where the product has negligible social utility
and an exceedingly high risk of injury. Despite its apparent following,
however, the Wilson footnote has never actually been utilized to hold
manufacturer liable for distributing a product which it could not have
redesigned. When confronted with real cases, the courts in Oregon,
Colorado, and Minnesota have adhered to the traditional defect standard and have persistently required plaintiffs to present evidence of a

225
226

Id. at 1328 n.5.
842 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992).

227

Id. at 185 n.11.
407 N.W.2d 92, 93 (Minn. 1987).
Id. at 97 n.8.

228

229
230

See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A.58C-3-b(1)-(3) (West 1987).
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reasonable alternative design.2 3 1 Thus, the extent to which the Wilson
court meant what it said is unclear. For the time being, its proposition
remains mere dictum.
Using the dictum in the Wilson footnote to carve out an exception
to the new Restatement's design defect standard would itself be manifestly unreasonable. Because the Restatement is supposed to reflect majority law, and since comment d's exception is not based on any valid
cases, the reporters and the A.L.I. should remove the comment from
future drafts.
C.

Comment d May Eviscerate Section Two

It is a platitude that exceptions can swallow rules. An exception
to an otherwise definite rule may indicate the rule's inherent weakness, or it may reflect the lawmakers' dissatisfaction with the rule's
substantive content.2 32 In the end, the exception often outlasts the
rule.2 33 Perhaps comment d's greatest weakness lies in the fact that

the co-reporters were unable to find any real-world examples of prod2 34
ucts that satisfy the "manifestly unreasonable design" standard.
Therefore, perhaps the co-reporters had to content themselves with
offering two hypothetical scenarios in which the comment might apply.2 33 Although this failure is completely understandable in light of

the consistent judicial and legislative rejection of categorical liability,
it results in an exception without delineated bounds. Indeed, because
most consumer products sold to the general public lend themselves to
both beneficial and harmful uses, nothing inherent in the logic of
comment d would prevent plaintiffs from challenging any products
that are unavoidably dangerous, such as knives, darts, automobiles
and motorcycles. Moreover, by failing to satisfactorily distinguish
231 See, e.g., Wood v. Ford Motor Co., 691 P.2d 495, 498 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)
("[P]laintiff must show that an alternative safer design, practicable under the circumstances, was available."); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 185-85 (Colo. 1992)
("[T]he existence of a feasible alternative is a factor in the risk-benefit analysis of the unreasonable dangerousness of the product design."); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d
92, 96 (Minn. 1987).
232 For example, in the heyday of products liability, courts manifested their dissatisfac-

tion with the privity doctrine by fashioning numerous exceptions to the rule. See, e.g.,
Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distribs. of Am., 444 So. 2d 1068, 107072 (Fla.App. 1984) (discussing gradual abrogation of privity doctrine through judicially
created exceptions). See generally Cornelius W. Gilliam, Products Liability in a Nutshel 37

OR.L. Rv. 119, 152-55 (1958) (discussing various devices employed by the courts to circumvent privity rule).
233 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (The Supreme
Court of NewJersey eliminated the privity requirement in warranty actions and established
that manufacturers are liable to all foreseeable users and consumers for breach of the
implied warranty of safety.); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
234 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
235 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. d.
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products that fall within its scope from products that still require
claimants to show the availability of a reasonable alternative design,
comment d indicates that the section 2 rule for design defectiveness is
itself in some way unsatisfactory. Thus, when courts finally decide
where to draw the line, it is the rule of section 2 which is likely to
crumble.
Additionally, because notions of public policy and consumer
safety are pervasive in products liability law, courts often err in the
consumers' favor.2 3 6 This is most evident in the evolution of section
402A from a rule intended to apply to foodstuffs and manufacturingtype defects, into a comprehensive doctrine applicable to all types of
products and several kinds of defects. 23 7 Consumer-minded courts
are therefore likely to read prodefendant rules narrowly and to stretch
their exceptions in order to provide at least some redress to injured
plaintiffs. As a result, before the A.L.I. carves out an exception to section 2(b)'s requirement that claimants challenging the design of a
product must point to a safer reasonable alternative available at the
time of manufacture, it should examine comment d and its virtues
with the greatest of care. Otherwise, a concession to the plaintiffs' bar
may eventually subvert the new Restatement's central and most efficacious provision.
In sum, before the A.L.I. succumbs to political pressures and retains comment d's exception to the reasonable alternative design requirement, it must consider that the exception may render the
application of section 2 design liability just as uncertain and fragmented as the design liability doctrine it is meant to replace. Comment d may seem attractive because it leaves certain classes of injured
plaintiffs-who would otherwise be completely barred from recovery-with a possible forum to obtain compensation. But, because the
comment would place the judiciary in the role of a legislature, and
because it finds no support in case law, the risk of returning to the
conceptual morass of the past should compel the A.L.I. to remove
comment d from the new Restatement.
CONCLUSION

The primary benefit of the new Restatement's standard for defective product design is its ability to capture the majority approach to
236 See, e.g., Closingthe Frontier,supra note 19, at 1270 (characterizing common law developments between 1960 and 1980 as "substantially proplaintiff"). See generally Henderson, supra note 54.
237

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961); 38 ALI PRoC.

349 (1964). See generallyGeorge L. Priest, Strict ProductsLiability: The OriginalInten4 10 CARDOZO L REv. 2301, 2311 (1989) (concluding that design defects were not intended to be
subject to strict liability).
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defective design in a relatively straightforward and uniform provision.
It replaces a fragmented and diverse doctrine with a single risk-utility
test which emphasizes manufacturers' ability to adopt safer alternative
designs. In an apparent attempt to appease members of the plaintiffs'
bar, the A.L.I. compromised this uniformity by carving out an undefined exception to the alternative design requirement in cases involving products with "manifestly unreasonable designs." The exception
is undefined because the judiciary's universal unwillingness to assess
the designs of entire product categories prevents any differentiation
between the exception and the general rule. The courts' steadfast rejection of categorical liability is explainable, at least in part, as a recognition that such issues should be left to the legislatures.
The American judiciary's historic respect for the Restatements requires the A.L.I. to proceed with the utmost care in drafting them. As
this Note argues, comment d's exception to the reasonable alternative
design requirement is unsupported by case law and would place the
judiciary in the role of a legislature. Moreover, its failure to define
what renders a product design manifestly unreasonable jeopardizes the
ideals of clarity and uniformity aspired to by the A.L.I. Hence, the
A.L.I. should remove comment d from the design defect section of
the new Restatement.
Michaelf Toke
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